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Abstract: Previous research has indicated that individuals typically perform quite poorly in discerning 
truths from lies, and that confidence in judged veracity is not predictive of objective accuracy. In this 
experiment, we investigated the joint influence of construal level and judgment mode on detection 
accuracy and confidence. Participants (N = 161) watched eight videotaped true and false statements while 
adopting a high or low level of construal, and received instructions to detect the deceptiveness of the 
statements either before (online judgments) or after (offline judgments) watching the videos. Contrary to 
our predictions, construal level and judgment mode did not influence detection accuracy independently 
or interactively. However, low level participants were less confident when making judgments offline as 
opposed to online, whereas the confidence of high level participants was unaffected by judgment mode. 
Implications for deception detection research and practice are discussed.  
Keywords: Truth and lie detection, judgment mode, construal level theory 
Truth or Tale? How Construal Level and Judgment Mode Affect 
Truth and Lie Detection
More than ever before, individuals are confronted with news, opinions, and accounts via numerous media 
and communication channels. To navigate successfully in such an information environment, individuals 
need to be able to tell the difference between true and false messages. When, for example, watching 
political debates, conducting job interviews, or talking about investment options with a financial advisor, 
it is important to know who speaks truthfully and who lies (Vrij, 2008). We argue that not only accuracy, 
but also individuals’ confidence in their judgments, might be of importance. As feedback on truthfulness 
is often lacking in everyday life (DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997), perceived 
confidence may prove to be a particularly important input variable in behavioral regulation. For instance, 
individuals rarely know whether a statement in political debates, former experiences described by a 
potential job candidate, or information about investment strategies are true or false; but they do have their 
experience of confidence to draw on (which, in fact, might not be closely aligned with the accuracy of their 
judgment; DePaulo et al., 1997; Reinhard, Sporer, & Scharmach, 2013). 
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The objective of this manuscript is to better understand and investigate both aspects: the objective 
accuracy in telling the difference between a truth and a lie, as well the individual’s confidence in the 
correctness of her/his judgments. In doing so, we focus on one variable that has proven particularly 
influential in the realm of judgment and decision-making: construal level as a function of psychological 
distance (Trope & Liberman, 2010). In what follows, we provide a brief overview of the literature of lie 
detection research. We then argue that construal level and judgment mode—whether individuals need 
to detect lies “online” (i.e., during the encoding of a statement) or “offline” (i.e., after the encoding of 
a statement)—have important implications for deception detection accuracy and perceived confidence 
in these judgments. Results of one study suggest that psychological distance does not reliably influence 
detection performance, but it does influence the confidence with which detection judgments are held. 
Detecting Deception
Following DePaulo et al. (2003), we define deception as a deliberate attempt to mislead others, and use 
the terms deceiving and lying interchangeably. In general, people lie most frequently about their feelings, 
their preferences, and their attitudes and opinions, and these lies are commonly told due to the seeking of 
a psychological reward, such as appearing more sophisticated or protecting oneself (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
Even though lies are frequent, differentiating whether somebody is trying to deceive or is telling the truth is 
a difficult endeavor and individuals only perform slightly better than chance level (54% compared to 50% 
accuracy, see Bond & DePaulo, 2006). One reason is presumably the high number of possible cues and 
the high complexity of integrating these cues in veracity judgments (Reinhard, Greifeneder, & Scharmach, 
2013, p. 721). Another reason, which does not reside within the individual, but follows from the information 
environment, is that cues for deception are typically weak, because liars and truth tellers do not differ much 
in their communication behaviors (DePaulo et al., 2003; see also Hartwig & Bond, 2011).  
A different perspective, focusing on self-presentation, is offered by DePaulo et al. (2003), who 
systematically investigated a multitude of potential deception cues. Within their meta-analysis, they 
explored whether truth and lie tellers differed regarding these cues. Greater differences would make the 
cue more useful for distinguishing between truthful and deceptive messages. The authors describe different 
findings regarding valid cues to deception. This data suggests that lies or deceptive messages make less 
sense; that lies are less plausible, less likely to be structured in a logical and sensible way, and in general 
less internally coherent.
Given that some cues are more valid than others, it is interesting to investigate conditions under which 
valid cues become stronger (Hartwig & Bond, 2011), are more or less likely to be used (Street, Bischof, Vadillo, 
& Kingstone, 2016), and under which more diagnostic cues can be integrated into deception judgments 
(Reinhard, Greifeneder, et al., 2013). In their meta-analysis, Bond and DePaulo (2006) argued that focusing 
on paraverbal and content cues compared to visual cues increases the detection rate. Furthermore, 
Reinhard, Greifeneder, et al. (2013) showed that an unconscious thinking mode compared to conscious 
deliberation can increase accuracy, and assumed that this superior detection performance of unconscious 
thought emerges due to the integration of a greater number and more diagnostic pieces of information (but 
see Moi & Shanks, 2015 for a failed replication using online instead of laboratory assessment; and Street 
& Vadillo, 2016 for a broader discussion of unconscious lie detection effects). Against this background, 
identifying variables that shift the focus from visual to more content and paraverbal cues and from single 
cues to multiple pieces of information appears promising. 
Impact of Construal Level on Truth/Lie Detection Accuracy: Alter-
native Hypotheses
Psychological distance may take this role and shift the focus from visual to more content or (para)verbal 
cues, and from single to multiple cues. Research on Construal Level Theory (CLT, Liberman & Trope, 1998, 
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2008) entails a series of findings on how individuals process information and derive both cognitive and 
affective judgments. CLT assumes that the way we think about objects or events—our level of mental 
construal—influences how we search for and integrate information, and how we make subsequent 
judgments and decisions. The level of construal is a continuous dimension between concreteness (low 
level) and abstractness (high level). Thinking about a forest on a higher level can be depicted as global, 
including features such as masses of green, fresh air, and being outside, while thinking about a forest on 
a lower level can be described as thinking about individual trees, with branches and leaves. Higher level 
construals include more abstract or superordinate information (the central features), focus more on the 
desirability of actions, and depend more on arguments in favor of a position (Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
Lower level construals additionally include more details and are therefore more concrete; they also consist 
of more subordinate information, focus on the feasibility of actions, and depend on arguments against a 
position. Therefore, depending on the construal level, individuals focus on different information, come to 
different conclusions, and make different judgments and decisions (Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
CLT further holds that the level of construal depends on the psychological distance towards the target 
objects or events. Objects or events that are psychologically far away are construed more abstractly (high 
level), while those that are psychologically closer are construed more concretely (low level). Changing 
psychological distance therefore affects the level of construal and subsequent judgments and decisions 
(Liberman & Trope, 2008). 
Research on Construal Level Theory has demonstrated that construing on a high level leads to more 
verbal thought, while thinking on a low level leads to more pictorial representations (Amit, Algom, & Trope, 
2009; Rim et al., 2015). Following Yan, Sengupta, and Hong (2016), this is presumably because individuals 
tend to rely more on visual processing when construing proximal events (low level mindset), but more 
on verbal processing when construing distant events (high level mindset). Applying these findings to the 
context of deception detection allows categorizing different perceived cues to deception as high level cues 
or low level cues. Verbal cues (e.g., the coherence of a statement) could be considered as high level cues and 
may be used more under an abstract mindset. Visual cues (e.g., gestures), in contrast, can be grouped into 
the category of low level cues and may be used more under a concrete construal. As DePaulo et al. (2003) 
show that truths tend to make more sense than lies, and the general coherence of a statement seems to be a 
valid cue for deception detection, individuals in high (vs. low) level mindsets may be more attentive to valid 
cues and, hence, achieve higher truth/lie detection accuracy. 
Construal Level Theory, however, also offers an alternative and competing hypothesis to the one outlined 
above. Reinhard, Greifeneder, et al. (2013) argue that integrating the particularly rich information available 
in statements might be necessary for accurate lie detection (see also Bull, 2004; Vrij, 2004), and provide 
support that this is more likely to occur under conditions of unconscious thought. Construal Level Theory, 
in turn, states that a high level construal is associated with the focus on central pieces of information, while 
low level construal also includes details and aspects of the situation (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Hence, 
construal level may affect deception detection in the opposite way as predicted above: a lower (versus 
higher) level mindset may increase the consideration of the more particularly rich information (versus the 
consideration of only one subjectively important cue, that may not even be valid due to false beliefs about 
valid cues; Akehurst, Kohnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996) and therefore increase the ability to accurately detect 
truths and lies. In this paper, we aim at testing these competing hypotheses experimentally. 
Impact of Judgment Mode on Truth/Lie Detection Accuracy
Our prior assumption that high level and low level construal mindsets shift lie-catchers’ attention toward 
different cues presumes a situation where individuals know at the time of encoding that they need to 
evaluate whether the communication is true or deceptive and thus can form an “online” judgment (Hastie 
& Park, 1986). In everyday life, however, individuals may not think about potential deception upfront. 
Instead, they may consider being lied to only after having listened to a statement, where a certain detail 
triggered doubt about its truthfulness. Individuals would then be required to remember the statement and 
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form a judgment “offline.” We refer to this variable as judgment mode, which may critically affect deception 
detection. Judgment mode may impact the nature of the deception task, as individuals either make an 
online judgment at the same time as encoding information or make judgments offline by relying on their 
memory. Note that judgment mode is orthogonal to construal level in the present study. 
The Joint Influence of Construal Level and Judgment Mode on 
Truth/Lie Detection Accuracy
Depending on whether individuals are asked to form a judgment online or offline, construal level may 
influence the encoding (and memory) of information in the former, but only memory in the latter case. 
Our previously stated hypotheses, that high and low construal level would increase deception detection 
accuracy due to a stronger focus on verbal cues or a better integration of rich information, both focused on 
the encoding and integration of information online. In an online decision mode, individuals would focus 
on valid information to a larger or smaller extent depending on a lower or higher level of construal. 
For offline judgments, individuals cannot regulate the extent to which they directly access valid 
information—instead, they need to recall information from their memory. Here, memory biases are more 
likely to impact deception detection accuracy. Previous research has shown that individuals in a high level 
construal mindset tend to perceive statements as more coherent and plausible in general, compared with 
individuals in a low level construal mindset (illusions of explanatory depth; see Alter, Oppenheimer, & 
Zemla, 2010). Therefore, a high construal level, which may lead to a stronger focus on the more valid verbal 
cues in an online judgment mode, may lead to a distorted memory of coherence and decrease deception 
detection accuracy as well as increase the tendency to evaluate statements as true (truth bias) in an offline 
mode. 
Consequently, we argue that the impact of construal level on deception detection depends on when 
individuals learn about the possibility of deception and therefore how they have to form their judgments. 
We expect that competing forces influence detection performance when individuals learn about deception 
before encoding and can form an online judgment, but not if this information is provided only at the 
time of judgment and individuals have to judge based on their memory (offline). In the offline judgment 
mode condition, we would argue that a high level construal might hamper deception detection due to an 
overestimation of plausibility (Alter et al., 2010) and a reduced focus on verbal cues. Low level construal 
instead might not be hampered when having to form judgments offline, as the focus and integration of 
details, which is related to bottom-up processing, is possible also without conscious thinking (Dijksterhuis 
& Nordgren, 2006; Reinhard, Greifeneder, et al., 2013). 
Confidence in Deception Judgments
Besides detection accuracy, the confidence with which detection judgments are held may be equally 
important in everyday life, even though it does not appear to be a predictor of accurate judgments. Many 
studies on deception detection provide evidence in this respect, as participants are typically asked how 
confident they are that their classification decision is correct (Reinhard, Sporer, et al., 2013). Aamodt and 
Custer (2006) concluded from their meta-analysis that confidence, besides age, experience, education, and 
sex, was not significantly related to accuracy in detecting deception. Other research has also indicated that 
the average weighted accuracy-confidence correlation does not significantly differ from zero (DePaulo et 
al., 1997). Yet, although confidence might not predict accuracy, it might still critically influence subsequent 
behavior: confidence in a judgment might be the only information available (as feedback on accuracy is 
usually not available) and may be experienced as particularly compelling in a similar way as feelings are 
(Bless & Forgas, 2000). Hence, it may be the strength of individuals’ beliefs about whether somebody is 
telling the truth or lying (and not the objective accuracy) that influences subsequent behavior (see research 
on how individuals’ mindset and not objective facts influences behavioral outcomes, e.g., Crum, Corbin, 
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Brownell, & Salovey, 2011; Langer, Djikic, Pirson, Madenci, & Donohue, 2010; Stoate, Wulf, & Lewthwaite, 
2012). It is therefore important to investigate and better understand which variables affect confidence 
ratings. As will be argued below, both construal level and judgment mode can affect confidence in the 
truth/lie detection judgments.
Impact of Construal Level and Judgment Mode on Confidence 
Ratings
As described above, mindsets influence processing mode and the information that is taken into account 
(Liberman & Trope, 2008). A lower level mindset leads to more attention being paid to low level information 
(such as details, feasibility aspects, and cons), and a higher level mindset leads to more attention being paid 
to high level information (abstract and central information, desirability aspects, and pros). We therefore 
investigated, in an exploratory fashion, the timing of when individuals learn about potential deception is 
important for individuals’ level of confidence, as it affects the degree of match or mismatch between their 
preferred and available processing modes. When individuals learn about potentially deceptive messages 
upfront, they could form their judgment online and thus apply their preferred processing mode (Yan et al., 
2016) or heuristics (Braga, Ferreira, & Sherman, 2015) to the situation. Specifically, individuals with a low 
level mindset could then look for details and visual cues and be confident in doing so. Individuals with a 
high level mindset could instead focus on the abstract representation and verbal information and also feel 
confident regarding their judgments. Förster and Higgins (2005, p. 633) argue that “when people pursue a 
goal in a manner that sustains or fits their motivational orientation, they “feel right” about what they are 
doing”. In the same manner, individuals could derive “value from fit” (Förster & Higgins, 2005; Hansen & 
Wänke, 2010; Higgins, 2000; Lee, Keller, & Sternthal, 2010) between the tasks goal of detecting deception 
and their mindset, which could result in higher levels of confidence. 
If, however, individuals learn about potentially deceptive messages after having watched the different 
statements and therefore need to form a judgment offline, the judgment should be perceived as more or 
less difficult, depending on the individual’s construal level. Individuals with a high level mindset can 
still focus on their abstract representation of the gist of the statement and perceive their representation 
as informative for the deception detection task. Research has also shown that relying on gist information 
might prohibit individuals from becoming distracted and confused by too much information (Fukukura, 
Ferguson, & Fujita, 2013), as gist memory captures the broader meaning of information and is more likely 
to be recalled (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Therefore, we assume that individuals with a high level mindset 
should not become less confident when having to make deception judgments offline (vs. online). Offline-
participants with a low level mindset, in contrast, may find it difficult to recall the details in the messages 
on which they would normally rely for their deception judgments. This would in turn harm their confidence 
in the judgments, as they cannot apply their preferred processing mode, and subsequently cannot derive 
value-from-fit (Förster & Higgins, 2005). Furthermore, low level representations, compared to high level 
representations, lead to more negative feelings about not knowing the truth (Shani, Igou, & Zeelenberg, 
2009). Such feelings may be boosted further in an offline judgment setting, as low level (vs. high level) 
individuals have greater difficulties remembering the information perceived as relevant to their judgments, 
which may result in lower levels of decision confidence (e.g., Kelley & Lindsay, 1993).
The Present Study
The present study was set up to investigate the joint influence of construal level and judgment mode on 
individuals’ truth/lie detection accuracy and confidence in these judgments. To be able to assess accuracy, 
we presented participants with eight videos in which the target persons were telling lies or the truth. Before 
and during the presentation of the videos, we manipulated participants’ construal level by varying the 
perceived psychological distance to the statements. Moreover, participants were told that the videotaped 
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statements were true or false either before watching the videos (online judgment mode) or directly afterwards 
(offline judgment mode). We recorded and analyzed deception and confidence judgments collected after all 
videos had been shown.  
We hypothesized that construal level affects truth/lie detection accuracy rates and test (1) whether 
individuals with a high compared to low level mindset more or less successfully distinguish between truth 
and lies when they learn about potential lies before encoding (online judgments). We further predicted that 
(2) when participants learn about potential lies after having watched all statements (offline judgments), 
a high level mindset, compared to a low level mindset, would lead to a decrease in truth/lie detection 
accuracy. With regard to confidence judgments, we investigated whether (3) judgment mode would interact 
with the influence of construal level. 
Method
Participants and design 
Based on assumed medium effect sizes (f = .25), an alpha-level of .05, and a desired power of 80%, G*Power 
ex ante calculations yielded a required sample size of a minimum of 128 participants (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, 
& Buchner, 2007). We increased this number by 25% to be able to exclude participants if control variables 
(see below) indicated to do so. Students were approached in the main building of a Swiss university 
and asked to participate in a short study on “person perception.” The resulting sample consists of 161 
individuals (95 females, 60 males, 4 indicated “I don’t want to answer this question,” 2 missing; Mage = 
24.41 years, SDage = 6.86). Two participants indicated to be 0 or 447 years old, and were therefore excluded 
from the descriptive statistics on age. Participants received 2 CHF (approximately 2 USD) and chocolate as 
compensation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (construal level: high 
vs. low) × 2 (judgment mode: online vs. offline) between-groups factorial design. 
Materials 
Participants were randomly assigned to watch one of three sets of eight videos each, that depicted students 
explaining which TV series or movie they especially did or did not like (see Reinhard, 2010). Half of the videos 
in each set included a person telling a lie (they reported liking a movie they did not like, or not liking a movie 
they actually liked), and the other half included a person telling the truth (they reported liking a movie they 
actually liked, or disliking a movie they actually disliked). For all recordings, the camera was positioned about 
3 meters away from the chair on which the person was seated, so that their head and upper body could be 
seen. Recordings lasted about 30 s, and the average message length did not differ significantly between true 
(M = 29.25 s, SD = 4.73) and deceptive messages (M = 30.00 s, SD = 3.51), t < 1. The order of the videos within sets 
was determined by randomization, and the same order was used for all participants.
Procedure
Participants gave informed consent, and started the session by putting on the headphones and watching 
a test video, in case they needed to adjust the sound volume. All participants were told that they would be 
asked to watch a few videos of persons who would speak about movies that they liked or did not like. To 
manipulate judgment mode, participants in the online condition learned upfront that some of the reports 
were true, while others were lies, and that potentially all reports could be true or false. Moreover, they were 
asked to first watch the videos and later evaluate whether each report was true or false. Participants in 
the offline condition received the information about the existence of true and deceptive reports only after 
having watched all videos. 
To manipulate construal level, half of the participants were asked to imagine being part of and being 
highly involved in the scene (low level), whereas the other half were asked to imagine standing about 10 
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meters away from the scene (high level). The actual size of the video on the screen was held constant across 
conditions. However, to reinforce participants’ imagination, the videos were placed into a frame the shape 
of a room, where the video appeared at the front of the room to indicate proximity (low level) or at the very 
back of the room to indicate distance (high level; see Appendix A). Participants watched all eight videos in 
a row before reporting their judgments. 
Having watched the eight videos, participants were asked to indicate, for each video, whether the 
depicted person told the truth (coded as 0) or lied (coded as 1), as well as how confident they were regarding 
their judgment on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = not confident; 7 = confident). To aid participants with this task, 
a screenshot of each video was shown before the two dependent variables were assessed. Furthermore, 
participants rated from which distance they imagined watching the videos (1 = very small distance; 7 = 
very large distance) and filled out the Behavior Identification Form (BIF, Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) as 
a manipulation check for construal level. This questionnaire asks individuals to identify a given action 
(e.g., making a list) in one of two options, a concrete version (e.g., writing things down) or a more abstract 
version (e.g., getting organized), therefore allowing the assessment of individuals’ tendency to construe 
more concretely versus abstractly. Finally, we asked for demographics, the carefulness with which they 
completed the study (1 = not carefully at all; 9 = very carefully), and any further comments. Participants were 
then thanked and received their compensation. 
Results
Manipulation check for construal level 
To test whether low level and high level participants differed on the BIF measure, we calculated an 
independent t-test with construal level as independent and the BIF score as dependent variable (total BIF 
score calculated such that one indicates only concrete answers, and two only abstract answers). Results 
indicate that low level participants (M = 1.49, SD = 0.18) were more concrete in their answers than high level 
participants (M = 1.56, SD = 0.17), t(159) = -2.78, p = .006, d = 0.44. In contrast the manipulation of judgment 
mode did not affect the BIF scores (M = 1.52, SD = 0.19, for online mode, and M = 1.53, SD = 0.17, for offline 
mode, t(159) = -0,31, p = .754, d = 0.06).
Depending on the construal level manipulation, participants also differed significantly in the distance 
from which they had imagined watching the videos, t(159) = -5.23, p < .001, d = 0.83, showing that low level 
participants imagined being closer to the videos (M = 3.29, SD = 1.15) than high level participants (M = 4.28, 
SD = 1.25).
Truth/lie detection accuracy
Classification accuracies (in percent) overall, and for true and deceptive messages separately, across 
construal level and judgment mode conditions are displayed in Table 1. Overall, the average percentage of 
correct lie/truth classifications was 54.27% (SD = 16.89), which is significantly above chance level (50%), as 
indicated by a one-sample t-test, t(160) = 3.21, p = .002, d = 0.25.
The percentage of messages judged as true (the so-called truth bias, in percent) overall, and for true 
and deceptive messages separately, across construal level and judgment mode conditions are displayed in 
Table 2. Overall, a truth bias is present, as the average percentage of classifications as “true” was 55.20% 
(SD = 13.80), which is significantly above chance level (50%), as indicated by a one-sample t-test, t(160) = 
4.78, p < .001, d = 0.38.
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations of accuracy of truth/lie judgments (in %) across all construal level and judgment 
mode conditions. 
Construal level Judgment mode
Lies Truths Overall
M SD M SD M SD
Low online 49.46 19.36 63.59 18.79 56.52 14.85
offline 48.48 21.60 62.12 23.49 55.30 19.52
High online 50.74 26.46 55.88 24.66 53.31 19.54
offline 47.92 21.16 56.25 20.95 52.08 14.88
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of messages judged as true (truth bias, in %) across all construal level and judgment 
mode conditions. 
Construal level Judgment mode
Lies Truths Overall
M SD M SD M SD
Low online 50.54 19.36 63.59 18.79 57.07 11.98
offline 51.52 21.60 62.12 23.49 56.82 11.31
High online 49.26 26.46 55.88 24.66 52.57 16.51
offline 52.08 21.16 56.25 20.95 54.17 14.89
To test Hypothesis 1 (i.e., that construal level affects truth/lie detection accuracy rates) and Hypothesis 2 
(i.e., that the effect of construal level is moderated by judgment mode), we calculated a 2 (construal level: 
high vs. low) × 2 (judgment mode: online vs. offline) ANOVA, with overall truth/lie detection accuracy as 
dependent variable. The results did not indicate any significant effects of construal level, nor any other 
variable or interaction on accuracy; for construal level: F(1,  157)  =  1.41, p  =  .237, ηp2  =  .01, for judgment 
mode: F(1, 157) = 0.20, p = .653, ηp2 = .00, and for the interaction: F(1, 157) = 0.00, p = .999, ηp2 = .00.  The data 
therefore does not provide support for Hypotheses 1 and 2.
To gain further insight to this outcome, we analyzed our data by calculating a Bayesian 2 (construal 
level: high vs. low) × 2 (judgment mode: online vs. offline) ANOVA (using the JASP software, Version 0.8.6, 
default settings), with overall truth/lie detection accuracy as dependent variable and report the resulting 
default Bayes factors (see Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012). Resulting Bayes factors (BF01) 
indicate the probability of the H0 (construal level and/or judgment mode have no effect on accuracy) 
relative to H1 (construal level and/or judgment mode have an effect on accuracy) given the data. The BF01 for 
the main effect of construal level is 2.74 (weak evidence, according to Raftery, 1995) and for the main effect 
of judgment mode 4.81 (positive evidence). However, the BF01 for the model with both main effects is 14.38 
(positive evidence), and for the full model including the interaction term 63.70. This last factor indicates 
that the probability of the H0 is 64 times higher compared to the H1, given the data, assuming the equal 
prior probabilities of the two hypotheses. According to Raftery (1995) we consider this as strong evidence 
for the null hypothesis. 
Moreover, the joint effects of construal level and judgment mode on truth bias were tested in a 2 
(construal level: high vs. low) × 2 (judgment mode: online vs. offline) ANOVA, yet no significant effects of 
construal level and judgment mode on the truth bias were obtained (all Fs < 2.62). 
Confidence judgments
In addition to assessing deception accuracy, we further asked individuals to rate their confidence in their 
deception judgment. To investigate individuals’ confidence regarding their judgments, we calculated a 2 
(construal level: high vs. low) × 2 (judgment mode: online vs. offline) ANOVA, with the average confidence 
Bereitgestellt von | Universitaetsbibliothek Basel
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 30.10.18 16:06
20   M.E. Jaffé, et al.
in lie detection judgments as dependent variable. Results, displayed in Figure 1, revealed a significant main 
effect of judgment mode, F(1, 157) = 4.64, p = .033, ηp2 = .03, indicating that participants who learned about 
potential lies before (online) rather than after (offline) watching the videos were more confident in their 
judgments (M = 5.00, SD = 0.65, and M = 4.77, SD = 0.78, respectively). This main effect was qualified by 
a significant interaction between construal level and judgment mode, F(1, 157) = 6.97, p = .009, ηp2 = .04. 
Simple main effects revealed that construal level did not significantly affect confidence when participants 
made their judgments online, F(1, 157) = 2.56, p = .111, ηp2 = .02, but did significantly affect confidence when 
participants made their judgments offline, F(1, 157) = 4.55, p = .034, ηp2 = .03. Specifically, when participants 
learned about potential lies after watching the videos (offline), high level (vs. low level) participants were 
more confident in their decisions (see Table 3). Furthermore simple main effects revealed that judgment 
mode affected confidence ratings significantly for participants with a low level mindset, F(1,157) = 11.29, 
p = .001, ηp2 = .07, but not in a high level mindset, F(1,157) = 0.12, p = .729, ηp2 = .00. Lastly, the main effect of 
construal level was not significant, F(1,157) = 0.14, p = .707, ηp2 = .00.
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of confidence judgments across all construal level and judgment mode conditions. 
Construal level Judgment mode
Lies Truths Overall
M SD M SD M SD
Low online 5.06 0.82 5.16 0.82 5.11 0.61
offline 4.64 0.97 4.50 0.99 4.57 0.80
High online 4.90 0.88 4.82 0.93 4.86 0.68
offline 4.89 0.89 4.94 1.01 4.91 0.74
Figure 1. Mean confidence judgments across construal level and judgment mode conditions [error bars indicate standard 
errors]. 
Exploratory analyses
For exploratory purposes, we analyzed the correlations between confidence, accuracy, BIF scores, and 
truth bias. None of the bivariate correlations reached significance, all rs < |.08|. 
Discussion
The current research investigated the influence of construal level and judgment mode on truth/lie detection 
accuracy deception judgments. The results of our study did not yield an effect of construal level or judgment 
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mode on the detection of deception. More specifically, the results failed to support our predictions that 
construal level would influence truth/lie detection accuracy for online judgments, and that low level 
participants would outperform high level participants for offline judgments. 
Looking at our second dependent variable—confidence in the deception judgments—we found that 
judgment mode significantly impacted confidence ratings. Participants who learned about potential lies 
upfront and could form an online judgment were more confident in their ratings. We assume that this 
effect occurred because learning about potential deception retrospectively (offline) may induce insecurity 
and doubts as one needs to remember the different statements and cannot make judgments on the go. 
This main effect was qualified by an interaction effect between judgment mode and construal level. In the 
online condition, the construal level mindset did not affect confidence. In the offline condition, however, 
low level participants showed lower confidence ratings than high level participants. We assume that this 
interaction occurs, as the nature of the task differs depending on the judgment mode and therefore differs 
in the extent to which it matches the manipulated construal level. Paying attention to details (low level) is 
more difficult when learning about potential deception after (vs. before) having watched the videos and 
forming a judgment offline. In contrast, thinking about the messages in a more abstract way (high level) is 
nevertheless still possible when forming offline judgments.
Reinvestigating the null-effect of construal level on detection accuracy, we assume that the lack of support 
for our hypothesis might be due to the competing forces exerted by, on the one hand, a high level mindset 
promoting a focus on more diagnostic verbal cues, and, on the other hand, a low level mindset promoting a 
reliance on a higher number of potentially valid pieces of rich information. Further research may fruitfully 
aim to disentangle the two potential pathways and include a control group without any manipulation of 
construal level to estimate a baseline effect. Independently of conceptual considerations, the observed null-
effect may also be due to the complexity of our operationalizations. Potentially, participants experienced 
the different video settings used to manipulate construal level as different to imagine. We have no data to 
test this concern but can positively state that our manipulation check data indicate that participants who 
imagined watching the video from afar (versus close) reported higher (versus lower) BIF-scores. Future 
research may perhaps benefit from exploring other effective ways to manipulate construal level that depend 
less on visualization. Furthermore, to ensure equal judgment tasks between online and offline conditions, 
participants first watched all the videos, and then made all the judgments with the help of screenshots. It 
is difficult to say whether participants adequately remembered the content of the statements when making 
their judgments. This may have contributed to the finding that general truth/lie detection accuracy was just 
above chance level. Additionally, this aspect of the design may have obscured any effects of construal level 
and judgment mode on detection accuracy, as variation in participants’ memory for the statements may 
have increased error variance.  
Future research may also replicate and further explore the effects of construal level and judgment 
mode on confidence ratings. We found a significant interaction effect of construal level and judgment mode 
on confidence ratings, with an effect size generally considered as small (ηp2 = .04). When judging online 
(compared to offline), participants were a third of a standard deviation more confident in their judgments 
(d = 0.32). More specifically, participants adopting a low construal level mindset, were about two-thirds of 
a standard deviation more confident when judging online compared to offline (d = 0.77). Note, however, 
that our construal manipulation was subtle and situational. Potentially, real-world differences in construal 
level are much stronger, especially if individuals self-select to construe on a high rather than a low level 
(Bless & Burger, 2016). Repeating the study outside the laboratory could provide a better basis for gauging 
the meaningfulness of the observed effect. 
Conclusion
All in all, we did not find that construal level and judgment mode systematically affect deception detection, 
potentially because they exert competing forces. But we did find that construal level and judgment mode 
systematically affect the confidence with which individuals evaluate the truthfulness of others. Individuals 
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felt more or less confident regarding their ratings depending on the setting of the study. These findings are 
of interest, because in everyday life, individuals often lack objective feedback with respect to the detection 
accuracy, but can rely on their feeling of confidence, and act upon this subjective experience. 
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Appendices
Appendix A: Manipulation material for high level (upper) and for low level mindset (lower). Pictures of 
persons in the videos have been anonymized due to confidentiality requirements.
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